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In May 2007, unknown attackers de-
clared cyberwar on Estonia. Estonians
woke up to find that the websites of their
banks, newspapers, and government agen-
cies had been systematically dismantled.
This was one of the world’s first cyberwar-
fare attacks; I argue that it won’t be the
last.
In the future, the amount of cyberwar-
fare will increase drastically. First, the in-
creased value of cyberspace increases the
incentives to wage cyberwarfare. Second,
the logic of cyberwarfare nullifies several
mechanisms that constrain territorial war.
Finally, the o↵ensive advantage inherent
in cyberwarfare exacerbates the security
dilemma. The United States lacks many
of its traditional military and economic
advantages in cyberspace; the increasing
importance of cyberwarfare will accelerate
the relative decline of American military
power.
For the purposes of this paper, I define
cyberwarfare as the use of computer pro-
grams to attack, disrupt, destroy, disable,
or steal anything of military, economic or
general strategic value or e↵orts to defend
against such attacks. I am not considering
industrial corporate espionage, cyber at-
tacks meant to aid the use of conventional
military force, or the use of internet media
to organize social action. In my definition,
cyberwarfare is not intentionally accompa-
nied by corresponding actions in the real
world.
Cyberwarfare Incentives
The strategic and economic value of
cyberspace is huge. Facebook and
Google were worth 200 billion dollars
and 400 billion dollars in 2014 respec-
tively. (Bloomberg.com, 2014) Billions of
people use the Internet daily, hundreds of
billions of dollars are traded yearly (Pew
Research Centers, 2013)—cyberspace is lu-
crative. However, the value of cyberspace
is limited in internet companies or transac-
tions; almost every large organization uses
the internet to communicate. (Meltzer,
2014) A corporation or government can
be crippled by the loss of their digi-
tal infrastructure from su↵ering cyberat-
tacks, Sony was completely shut down for
four days. (Cunningham &Waxman, 2014)
Four days of no internal communication
in the American federal government would
be a disaster. Few human activities don’t
go through the internet: it controls every-
thing from our bank accounts to television
shows, from Facebook to large swathes of
the American power grid. (Tucker, 2014) A
state needs to guard its cyberspace in order
to ensure stability.
It’s unlikely internet reliance will de-
crease. Humanity’s relationship with the
internet changes rapidly—as new technol-
ogy develops, more opportunities exist for
companies and inventions to a↵ect our
lives. For example, the rise of smart-
phones provided opportunities for dozens
of new start-ups and another way for
humans to interact digitally. (Dougherty,
2015) Finally, millions of people have yet
to come online. In the United States, cell-
phone usage almost doubled from 2011 to
2014. (Pew Research Centers, 2013) Mi-
crosoft predicts that there will be 4 bil-
lion internet users by 2020, most new users
coming from developing countries. (Cyber
Trust Blog, 2013) As the internet popula-
tion increases, the value of cyberspace will
increase even more.
Cyberspace is valuable today and will
almost certainly be more valuable tomor-
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row.1
1I would argue that the value of physical space is decreasing as well. A full-fledged explanation
is outside the scope (and word count) of this paper, but the decreased value of physical territory
also increases the value of cyberspace.
States need to protect their own
“digital territory” in order to shield their
governments, militaries, and corporations
from disruption. As the value of cy-
berspace increases, the incentives to wage
cyberwarfare increase as well. The stakes
have risen—states need allocate more re-
sources to cyberwarfare, either in hopes of
hurting other states or defending against
attackers.
The increasing strategic value of cy-
berspace does not, by itself, imply a cor-
responding rise in cyberwarfare. However,
the anonymous nature of cyberwarfare re-
moves three causal mechanisms that dis-
courage conventional conflict. Without
these conflict-reducing e↵ects, increased
conflict becomes more likely.
No More Restrictions
Scholars have discussed multiple reasons
for the current decline in conventional war-
fare. Unfortunately, three proposed expla-
nations for why conflict is discouraged in
the modern system are rendered invalid by
cyberwarfare.
First, as hegemon armed with dom-
inant conventional military force, the
United States has the incentive and the
means to quash weaker states’ attempts to
expand or balance against it. (Wohlforth,
1999) It is possible that the threat of
American retaliation and intervention has
prevented dozens of potential armed con-
flicts. Second, nuclear deterrence discour-
ages war. The threat of mutually as-
sured destruction prevented conventional
warfare during the Cold War. Third, in-
creased economic interdependence makes
economic costs from war too high—the cur-
rent system of global trade is so intertwined
that few countries would gain from conflict.
Any one of these factors, or more likely a
combination, may drastically reduce con-
flict in the modern era. However, these ob-
stacles simply don’t apply to cyberwarfare.
For the first time in history, it
is possible for a state to weather at-
tacks that damage their military, eco-
nomic, or industrial infrastructures and
not be able to confidently determine
the identity of their attacker. James
Lewis states, “Identity is easily concealed
in cyberspace...sophisticated attackers are
skilled not only at hiding their identity
but also making it look as if someone
else was responsible”. (International Re-
lations And Security Network, 2009) At-
tackers can disguise their IP addresses or
“transmit their attacks through multiple
nodes of transmission” (Rattray, 2001, 66)
in order to disguise themselves or blame
other actors. It’s almost impossible for
cyber defenders to be completely certain
about an attacker’s identity—even if the
evidence clearly points to one actor, it
may just be an attempt to shift blame
by a sophisticated attacker. Gregory Rat-
tray adds, “Depending on the sophistica-
tion of the attacker, it’s possible to leave
the defender unsure if an attack actually
occurred”. (Rattray, 2001) The ability for
attackers to completely disguise themselves
completely topples conventional security
logics.
Actors can attack in cyberspace with-
out fearing retaliation. Without knowing
the attacker’s identity, the United States
can’t intervene. Similarly, if states don’t
know the identity of their attacker, nu-
clear deterrence is useless. It would be
irresponsible to threaten nuclear reprisal
over cyberattacks when it is so di cult to
accurately determine the identity of the
attacker. Even if the identity of the at-
tacker seems obvious, it’s impossible to
completely rule out the possibility of an-
other actor shifting blame onto an innocent
party. Finally, in cyberwarfare, a state can
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attack another state and trade with it at
the same time. States can engage in cyber-
warfare without risking losses from trade;
defending states wouldn’t know with whom
they should stop trading. Cyberwarfare
doesn’t invalidate all possible reasons for
the reduction of conflict, but it completely
dismantles three major ones.
By itself, the increased value of cy-
berspace and the increased ease of con-
flict doesn’t guarantee more cyberwarfare.
However, due to the o↵ensive advantage of
cyberwarfare, the security dilemma in cy-
berspace is greatly exacerbated. Even if
states don’t intend to wage o↵ensive cyber-
warfare, it is di cult for states to escape
the security dilemma.
O↵ensive Advantage and the Security Dilemma
The security dilemma states that when
states attempt to increase their security,
they almost always inadvertently threaten
other states. This causes other states to
attempt to increase their own security, ul-
timately decreasing security for the first
state and increasing the likelihood of con-
flict. There are two variables that tend
to exacerbate or ameliorate the security
dilemma.
First, the relative advantage of of-
fensive weapons, tactics, and strategies
over their defensive equivalents exacerbates
the security dilemma. Robert Jervis ex-
plains that when o↵ensive advantage ex-
ists, even status-quo states “must then
act like aggressors; the fact that they
would gladly agree to forego the oppor-
tunity for expansion in return for guaran-
tees for their security has no implications
for their behavior”. (Jervis, 1978, 87) In
a world with o↵ensive advantage, it is dif-
ficult for states to defend themselves; the
best way to maintain security is to attack.
Clearly, this greatly exacerbates the secu-
rity dilemma—if states are more likely to
attack than defend, any perceived increase
in military power is extremely dangerous.
Furthermore, the expectation of easy vic-
tory increases the incentives for o↵ensive
war.
In cyberspace, o↵ense has a clear ad-
vantage. According to Robert Ghanea-
Hercock, “O↵ense is favored over de-
fense. . . since only a single point of fail-
ure in a cyber network, or process, is re-
quired for a successful attack”. (Ghanea-
Hercock, 2012) Cyber defenders need to
protect thousands of nodes in a network;
attackers need only to gain access through
one. Accordingly, the amount of code
needed to construct defense towers over
the few hundred lines of code needed to
conduct an attack. (Singer & Friedman,
2014) Defensive programs cost more time,
money, and e↵ort. Not only is it easy
to find holes in opponents’ defenses, but
the locations of those vulnerabilities is eas-
ily disseminated, making it easy for even
unsophisticated attackers: Rattray says,
“Widely used products contain vulnerabil-
ities to digital disruption that are easily
identified...the tools and techniques to ex-
ploit them are quickly disseminated among
potential attackers”. (Rattray, 2001, 470)
Finally, o↵ensive advantage is bolstered
by the rapidly changing nature of cyber
weapons. It’s easy for attackers to de-
sign new weapons; when a government
agency or corporation designs an e↵ective
counter to one o↵ensive technique, several
more weapons can be created. David T.
Fahrenkrug says, “The current o↵ensive
advantage results from the ability to ma-
neuver against a network combined with
rapidly adaptive tools to attack networks
and information”. (Czosseck, 2012) O↵ense
is more e↵ective, easier, and cheaper.
Perception of o↵ensive advantage is ar-
guably more important than the actual ex-
istence of o↵ensive advantage. After all,
states act according to their perceptions of
the world, not necessarily the real world.
Major actors still believe that o↵ensive has
the advantage. In 2010, when describing
the Pentagon’s new cyberdefense strategy,
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the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense made
clear that “In cyberspace, the o↵ense has
the upper hand”. (Lynn, 2010) Conven-
tional wisdom favors the o↵ensive in cy-
berspace.
The second variable that impacts the
security dilemma is the perceivable dif-
ferentiation between o↵ense and defensive
weapons or postures. If a state can see
that other states are increasing their se-
curity through defensive means, it is less
likely to feel threatened. The more dif-
ferentiation, the more informations states
have about other states’ intentions.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to dif-
ferentiate o↵ensive cyberwarfare from de-
fensive cyberwarfare. Investment in cyber
warfare simply cannot be divided into of-
fense and defense. Both involve investment
in trained personnel and powerful comput-
ers. Personnel trained in cyber defense
need to be intimately familiar with meth-
ods of attack in order to defend against
them—it’s impossible to di↵erentiate be-
tween “o↵ensive” and “defensive” cyber-
soldiers. Computers can be used for both
o↵ensive and defensive maneuvers. There
is no meaningful distinction. The na-
ture of the security dilemma makes cy-
berspace conflict more likely. In an o↵ense-
dominated world with no distinction be-
tween o↵ense and defense, even status-quo
states are likely to resort to aggression and
cyberattacks.
In the 21st century, actors have the
incentive and the means to increase cy-
berwarfare: the value of cyberspace will
increase, providing incentives for o↵en-
sive cyberwarfare, and several mechanisms
that have traditionally constrained conflict
won’t apply, giving actors the opportunity
to wage war. Even status quo actors will
be unable to escape the security dilemma,
causing more conflict. In a future char-
acterized by increased cyberwarfare, the
United States loses several key advantages.
American Loss
The United States loses its advantageous
geographical position. The Atlantic and
Pacific oceans form natural lines of defense
for the United States and make conven-
tional land attacks di cult. The United
States’ two neighbors have never posed
substantial military threats, easing the
path to regional hegemony. Furthermore,
the United States’ relative isolation enables
it to possess substantial power without be-
ing incredibly threatening. Since a state’s
capacity to project power declines over
distance, far o↵ powerful states become
less threatening than weaker neighboring
states. If states do balance against threat
and not necessarily power, as Stephen Walt
surmises, then the United States is able to
enjoy substantial military capacities with-
out threatening other states and provoking
balancing. (Walt, 1985)
Unfortunately for the United States,
physical geography is irrelevant in cy-
berspace. The United States’ “moats”
won’t dissuade cyberattacks. In cy-
berspace, all countries are neighbors —the
United States’ threat level will increase,
sparking increased balancing against the
United States.
Additionally, the United States’ diplo-
matic advantage will be mitigated. More
than any other state in the system, the
United States benefits from a large net-
work of formal and informal military al-
liances. However, since cyberwarfare con-
fuses traditional definitions of war, the
United States cannot rely heavily on al-
liances like NATO for support. For exam-
ple, it’s unclear whether a cyberattack on
the United States would trigger NATO’s
collective security clause. Allies of the
United States could shirk their responsi-
bilities to the United States, arguing that
cyberattacks do not constitute war. As
cyberwarfare becomes more common, 20th
century organizations have to adjust for a
21st century world. Traditional military al-
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liances are less e↵ective.
Furthermore, because of the nature of
cyberwarfare, the United States’ economic
and military advantages are diminished.
In this case, the disadvantaging e↵ect of
cyberwarfare does not apply only to the
United States, but all conventionally pow-
erful states. First, more technologically
developed states are inherently more vul-
nerable in cyberwarfare. Large developed
countries have more electronic infrastruc-
ture to defend; the larger your network, the
more vulnerabilities you present to your at-
tacker. Stronger actors have more to lose
than weaker actors do in cyberwarfare.
The United States is “the society most
reliant on its information systems and in-
frastructures”. (Rattray, 2001, 8) Accord-
ing to Pentagon o cials, “massive net-
working makes the U.S. the world’s most
vulnerable target for information warfare...
The U.S. has orders of magnitude more to
lose from information warfare than its com-
petitors”. (Clapper, 1997) Not only does
the United States more vulnerable to at-
tacks, but it also risks more when attack-
ing—because American cyber infrastruc-
ture is so large, American cyber attacks
can cause collateral damage to American
digital infrastructure. (Rattray, 2001, 191)
If the USA engages in sustained cyberwar-
fare, it simply has more to lose than any
other actor in the system.
Second, the United States’ great indus-
trial and population advantage is dimin-
ished. Political historians often use indus-
trial capacity and population to measure
power—Paul Kennedy uses industrial and
population measures to determine great
power status in The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers. (Kennedy, 1987) The huge
industrial capacity of the United States
contributes to its status as hegemon. In
cyberspace, however, industry and popula-
tion are much less important.
In conventional warfare, the number of
tanks or planes a state possesses is a good
indicator of its military power. In cyber-
warfare, the number of computers doesn’t
matter: “The tools and techniques used for
digital attacks require relatively little ca-
pacity in terms of commercially available
computational power, storage space, and
transmission capacity”. (Kennedy, 1987,
138) Cyber conflict privileges quality of
programming, not necessarily industrial
strength and material wealth. Individ-
ual programmers with outdated comput-
ers can wreak havoc. Rattray explains,
“Some of the most disruptive viruses un-
leashed in the early 1990s were produced
by students using computers with 286 pro-
cessors at a technical high school in Bul-
garia”. (Kennedy, 1987, 138)
In the same way, the number of soldiers
are less important in cyber conflict. Train-
ing and creativity trumps quantity of com-
batants. The infiltrators of Rome Labora-
tory, the R&D lab and technological heart
of the United States Air Force, turned
out to be a lone teenager armed with
a home computer. (Kennedy, 1987, 138)
Rattray mentions that “Human expertise
and organizational coordination will likely
prove the constraining factors in planning
and execution of strategic information war-
fare attacks, not availability of hardware
and software tools”. (Kennedy, 1987, 138)
The main quantitative constraint in cy-
berwarfare is the accumulation of enough
trained individuals: “personnel shortages
and changing skill requirements consti-
tute a major barrier to successful informa-
tion technology assimilation in the United
States and elsewhere”. (Kennedy, 1987,
178) To be sure, large industrial capac-
ity and population don’t hurt the United
States—in fact, because of its large, well-
educated population, the United States
is more likely to produce talented hack-
ers—but in cyberwarfare, they’re much less
important than they used to be.
In part because of the low quantita-
tive requirements, the cost to enter cyber-
warfare is low. Rattray writes, “The cost
of acquiring the necessary means [for dig-
ital attacks] is low, especially in relation
to conventional forces and most WMD al-
ternatives. A much wider range of ac-
tors can consider employing such a form
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of warfare”. (Kennedy, 1987, 469) This di-
minishes the relative military advantage
of the United States. Although highly-
trained individuals are important, even a
modicum of skill gives actors the ability to
wage cyberwarfare: “acquiring the techni-
cal knowledge to conduct digital warfare
has become increasingly easy”. (Kennedy,
1987, 190) Cyberspace is the great level-
ing ground; actors without large popula-
tions or industrial might can wield undue
influence. Because so many weak actors
can participate in cyberwarfare, the United
States’ relative military strength declines.
Finally, it will be di cult for the
United States to completely control certain
regions of cyberspace. In territorial con-
flict, strong countries can attempt to se-
cure strategically important areas in order
to protect vulnerabilities or maintain prime
attacking position. The United States can
secure its borders or control the “com-
mons”— the sea, air, or space. (Posen,
2003) However, it’s impossible to com-
pletely protect “space” in cyberspace. Any
connection in and out of a cyberspace “ter-
ritory” is an another avenue for attack. In
order to e↵ectively protect such an area,
the space needs to be completely isolated,
rendering it e↵ectively useless. Without
the ability to completely secure spaces in
cyberspace, powerful actors lose another
advantage.
Some of the United States’ advantages
will translate beautifully into cyberwar-
fare. The United States is the most techno-
logically advanced country in the world. It
houses the vast majority of the world’s top
technical universities and internet compa-
nies. Those universities and companies are
a major producer of top-level cyberwarfare
talent.
The high skill level of the United
States’ cyberwarriors ensures that United
States will be the strongest state in cy-
berspace, However, due to the United
States’ disadvantages, it is unlikely that
the United States will enjoy dominance in
cyberspace to the same degree that it does
in real space. The United States is a con-
ventional military hegemon; it will not be
a military hegemon in cyberspace.
Conclusion
As seen above, states have two di↵er-
ent military capacities; cyberspace military
power and conventional military power. As
cyberwarfare assumes a higher proportion
of all conflicts, states’ cyberspace militaries
will begin to matter more than conven-
tional militaries. This won’t make Amer-
ica’s conventional military edge completely
irrelevant; however, the United State’s
overall military dominance will diminish.
2
2In fact, it might be the case that the United States’ overwhelming conventional military dom-
inance discourages conventional war, thereby encouraging increased cyberwarfare.
Although the United States will still be
the strongest state in the system, it will
no longer enjoy military hegemonic status.
This paper predicts rampant cyber-
warfare and a United States with dimin-
ished cyberwarfare capabilities. However,
the continually changing nature of cy-
berspace makes prediction particularly dif-
ficult. Technological advances might re-
move anonymity and ensure e↵ective retal-
iation. Internet predictions must consider
the possibility of rapid change. Still, given
present facts, increased conflict seems cer-
tain.
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